TOWARDS THE HISTORICAL DYNAMICS OF A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE? SEARCHING FOR “EUROPE” AND “EUROPEAN ISSUES” IN POLISH POST-WAR STUDIES ON MEDIA CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

This article starts from the premise that rather than being a solely contemporary notion or a concept related to the development of the European Union, European Public Sphere (EPS) should be viewed as a historically conditioned process, which draws on a longue durée of European perceptions and imaginaries constructed and disseminated in the national contexts. By looking at existent analyses of national media contents, this article, which draws on the analysis of over a hundred media studies, provides an extensive and critical examination of post-War Polish media discourses on “Europe” and “European issues” (including definitions of “Europe”, “Europeanness”, “European identity”, and “European values”). Seeing the role that those issues played in Polish media discourses during the period between 1945 and 2005 (i.e. from the end of World War II, through the development and fall of the Communism, up until and including Polish accession to the EU), the

1 This paper is based on the work conducted by the author within the framework of a research project “EMEDIATE: Media and Ethics of a European Public Sphere – From the Treaty of Rome to the War on Terror” (2004–07, coordinator: Bo Stråth, EUI Florence). The author would like to acknowledge the generous financing of the project provided by the European Commission (Project no. CIT2-CT-2004–506027) within the EU’s Sixth Framework. For further details, see: http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/EMEDIATE.
article locates when and where ethical notions related to the idea of Europe were negotiated and appropriated within media discourses. The article also attempts to find examples of (possibly) transnational and event-specific aspects of reporting in order to discover the historical development of either Polish or transnational media constructions of a European Public Sphere.

**Key words:**

media, media research, Poland, Europe, European Public Sphere, European identity, European values

1. **Introduction: Towards a European Public Sphere**

Drawing extensively on Jürgen Habermas and his ideas on the transformation of the public sphere\(^2\), throughout the 1990s and 2000s several academic debates aimed at scrutinising whether the public sphere is indeed a viable concept for the world characterised by diverse post-national tendencies such as globalization, trans-nationalization, or, in the specifically European context, the development of a supranational European integration. In line with those debates a variety of theoretical approaches were developed and either postulated the imminent downfall of the post-Enlightenment public sphere in (late) modern democracies\(^3\) or related the evident crisis of the (national) public sphere(s) to the growth of global tendencies rooted in such processes as the evolving trans-nationalism and cosmopolitanism\(^4\) also in terms of the media and their production/reception\(^5\).

It was the latter – “global” or “transnational” – tendency in thinking about the public sphere that clearly influenced the debates on the European Public Sphere (hereinafter: EPS), which, so far, proved to be one of the major concepts in the


\(^5\) N. Fraser, *Transnationalizing the Public Sphere*, Paper Presented at the Conference “Identities, Affiliations, Allegiances” 2003, No. 3–4.
recent debates. By the same token, discussions of the EPS were initiated when academic disputes oriented towards the public sphere developed in Europe and where they were tied to the then ongoing debates about the crisis of the European Union and its ensuing democratic deficit. In what followed, a number of theoretical discussions about the need for creating a strong EPS were developed at the backdrop of a claim that, without the EPS, trans-/supra – or post-national democratization within Europe could not take place. Or, as Eriksen argued, “only with a European-wide public sphere in place can the requirements of democracy beyond the nation state be met”.

Many theoreticians of the EPS pointed to the necessity of elaborating the mechanisms upon which the EPS can be developed. One of the first and most widely acclaimed models proposed in this context was that by Gerhards, who argued that the EPS can be developed by means of a simultaneous set of processes of a) development of a “common” EPS through growth of a shared, pan-European media system and b) Europeanization of the existent national public spheres and respective national media systems. In the absence and general underdevelopment of pan-European channels of communication detached from national media institutions, it is not surprising that mostly the second set of processes of EPS construction postulated by Gerhards garnered academic attention and yielded a vast

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number of studies showing inasmuch the national media are becoming “Europeanized.”

The said studies on the Europeanization of the national media yielded a number of conceptions, which helped to empirically assess how and when EPS is actually constructed in the discourses of the national media. Among the the most popular conceptions proposed there were, for example, associated studies by Eder and Kantner\textsuperscript{12}, as well as Risse and van de Steeg\textsuperscript{13}, who related EPS-making to the development of similar points or frames of reference to (and interpretation of) European (incl. EU) matters in national media discourses. A corresponding idea of common points of reference and patterns of interpretation of European issues was also developed further in a set of studies proposed by Koopmans and Erbe\textsuperscript{14} or by Statham and Gray\textsuperscript{15}. Focusing respectively on German and British media reporting, the authors put forth a claim that the construction of an EPS takes place along the lines of two traditional vectors of Europeanization of the national media. Those vectors align with the so-called “horizontal” and “vertical” Europeanization, with the former based on cross-references to political events and occurrences in other EU Member States, and the latter on references to the EU as a “core” of the European polity (such as the EU and its institutions). While the majority of studies on the construction of EPS in the national media focused on their aforementioned Europeanization, some in-depth studies also pointed to the actual ways in which EU politics and EU-related political processes are presented in the media\textsuperscript{16}.

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\textsuperscript{12} K. Eder, C. Kantner, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{13} T. Risse, M. Van de Steeg, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{14} R. Koopmans, J. Erbe, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{15} P. Statham, E. Gray, \textit{The Public Sphere and Debates about Europe in Britain. Internalized and Conflict-Driven?}, “Innovation” 2005, No. 1, Vol. 18, p. 61–81.

Towards the Historical Dynamics of a European Public Sphere?

While the majority of those studies pointed to diverse regularities in the ways in which EU politics are presented in Europe’s national media, works, such as by Oberhuber et. al.\(^\text{17}\), pointed to the fact that the negative framing prevails in most instances of reporting.

However, it seems that the major problem of the empirical research on the European Public Sphere through the “Europeanization” of the national media proposed to date resided in the largely ahistorical character of most of the studies proposed in late 1990s and early 2000s. Namely, the majority of the works from that period focused solely on synchronic aspects of construction of the EPS by looking at how the current – especially EU and Europe-wide specific events – were reported across the national media. Accordingly, the political organism of the EU was almost always treated as central to the development of the EPS while the visions and conceptions of Europe and the EU circulating in the EPS were treated as if “produced anew” in the course of national interpretations of ideas and actions related to the evolving political “core” of the EU since the 1990s\(^\text{18}\).

Going against the EU-centric trends, several works have argued that EPS cannot be considered as a “new” and a strictly synchronic process. On the contrary, it was argued for the necessity of finding a historically sensitive perception of the EPS and claimed that many of the current aspects of the EPS – as well as the reasons for its still apparent absence or underdevelopment – stem from the fact that, as such, prevalent visions of supranational EU-robe do not draw on the longue durée of European perceptions and imaginaries, which existed in national domains long before the arrival of the European Union. Some of those studies\(^\text{19}\) even showed that the traditional ways of reporting (and the traditional interpretation) of post-War European crises – such as Prague in 1956, 1968 in both Western and Eastern Europe, 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe, and so on – have for a long time been

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indicative of why a post-national EPS cannot unfold in a situation where national interpretations of socio-political change always prevail in the European media.

2. Aims and Scope of the Research

This study contributes to the said “historical” trend of research on the European Public Sphere by looking at whether/how Europe and related notions were portrayed in the national media. By analysing secondary sources from within Polish post-war media research, this article presents an extensive examination of Polish post-1945 media studies on “European issues” (including definitions of “Europe”, “Europeanness”, “European identity”, and “European values”) while trying to define key tendencies, as well as shifts and changes, in the role those issues played in Polish media discourses in the period between 1945 and 2005. The said period covers, on the one hand, media developments which span the time of communist rule (between 1945 and 1989) in Poland and, on the other hand, the times following democratization of Polish public life up until and beyond the Polish EU accession in 2004. As such, this work dovetails with other, complementary examinations of “Europe” and related notions in the primary studies, which analysed media contents from the point of view of the dynamics of EPS in different periods of crisis in the post-War European history. The study also contributes to a different body of work, which looked at Europe from the perspective of secondary analyses. However, in the current case, a much more historically oriented analysis is provided by covering, inasmuch possible, the entire post-War period.

Through the analysis of Polish post-war media studies, this study attempts to assess in particular what definitions and/or representations of Europe and Europeans were negotiated in media debates as well as to find and follow debates on European ethics/European values/European morality in existing media studies. This work also locates when and where ethical notions related to the idea of Europe – i.e. European values/ethics – were negotiated and appropriated within the studied works as well as attempts to find examples of (possibly) transnational aspects of reporting. Hence, this work looks at the historical development of – either specifically Polish or indeed transnational – conception of a European Public Sphere.

20 Cf. M. Krzyżanowski, Europe in Crisis..., op.cit.; The European Public Sphere..., op.cit.
More specifically, this article aims to define the scope and diversity of the previously defined “European issues” by focusing in particular on:

a) **Visions of Europe, forms of Europeaness, and/or European Values.** Here, an attempt is made to see how “Europe” (as a social and historical concept) is defined and whether the available definitions are characterised by any strict sets of, for example, geographical, political, economic, and other criteria. Also, the article tries to see inasmuch, in the analysed Polish media studies, that the said concepts of Europe are “put into practice” and acquire any pragmatic, socio-political meaning through the dynamic definitions of “Europeaness”. Within the analysis of the latter, the article looks at how Europeaness can be defined through, e.g. the fact of “belonging” or “non-belonging” to Europe, European civilization or to the largely defined European space. In this context, the article also scrutinises how allegiance to (or denial of) any sets of European values can be used to portray particular (individual and collective) social or political actors as “European”. Finally, the article tries to enumerate various catalogues of “European (or related) values” by aiming to identify them as stemming from national and/or international/European ways of talking about Europe (and/or EU) and by trying to see whether those values are indeed any instances of historical concepts or meanings of Europe or whether they are “newly-defined” in a context specific and nationally unique (or other) way.

b) **The “Event-Specific Negotiation” of European issues (incl. Europe, Europeaness, and/or European values).** Here, the article attempts to delineate whether, and how, “European issues” are introduced and explicitly/implicitly negotiated in connection with various “real-world” social and political events. Thus, it aims to see which of the events triggered the negotiation of European issues in media discourses while also scrutinising whether those events were of either nationally-specific or transnational/European character (through their negotiation in one/more of the countries in question).

c) **The State-Transcending interest of the Media Studies (on “European issues”).** This is where, according to the analysed secondary sources (“media studies”), this study tries to define inasmuch the latter displayed and/or triggered varied national interests in other-than-national media and their negotiation of “European issues” (also, if applicable, in an event-specific manner of those negotiations). Thus, it is attempted to show how, through the academic interests therein, foundations of a transnational, European Public Sphere (EPS) are laid through the state-transcending interests of various nationally localised scholars and researchers. Here, the article also focuses on whether
any attempts are made by those who authored respective, country-specific media studies to compare “national” and “foreign” media and their varied attempts to define and negotiate the said “European issues”.

This study is based on an extensive analysis of a corpus of secondary material of over 110 existent Polish studies focusing on media contents / media discourse. Altogether, within the analysed corpus, the number of media studies on “European issues” amounts to thirteen relevant works published during the period of investigation (1945–2005). Those works are clearly falling within the two phases, which divide the time scope of the study between 1945–1989 (during the times of the Communist rule in Poland) and 1989–2005 (after the fall of the Communism and in the run up to the Polish EU accession). Due to limitations of space, only selected, exemplary studies from those two periods are discussed below.

In the first phase (1945–1989), this work presents several studies, which are the most “typical” instances of the media-research, which, in its scope and focus, comes close to the main research questions enumerated above and either pertain to the international press reporting (thus allowing us to see the actual scope of “international” – or possibly also “European” – interest of Polish pre-1989 media) or directly focus on the issues central for our investigations such as “values”, changing social axiology and its role in press reporting and alike (treated in a very general way). It must be noted from the outset that none of the studies presented below deals in a direct way with the questions of Europe, Europeanness, and European values as those issues are consequently absent from all of the analysed pre-1989 Polish media studies. It must also be noted that, despite the time scope of our investigation pertaining to the entire period between 1945 and 1989, it is only since the early 1970s that we can identify any studies that are at least close to our research interests. It is assumed that the very difficult shape of the post-1945 Polish media landscape under the communist regime might dictate the fact that any comprehensive studies on the media appear that late in the analysed period. Accordingly, it is crucial to see that any international interest in the media research was actually possible only after the changes brought about by 1968 and in the course of the “politics of international openness” followed in Poland only since the early 1970s.

On the other hand, in terms of their frequency, the analysed studies in the 1989–2005 period may also be grouped in two sub-phases: one pertaining to the period 1989–1991 (in addition to the year of 1994 elaborated in some studies), and the other starting from 2001 onwards. Those two periods largely coincide with two socio-political phenomena in Poland: the first one being “the big change of 1989” (perceived as a prolonged process rather than a single event) and the other being Poland joining the European Union (again, starting well before the actual accession in May 2004). Apart from the studies pertaining to these two “phases” (and summarised above), Europe, as it seems, does not come around as a topic of media analysis during the 1989–2005 period. This, in turn allows us to see that media-specific negotiation of Europe, Europeanness, and European values (reflected in/through the media studies) took place only (before, after or) at the time of very significant social and political changes.

3. A Critical Overview of Polish Media Studies on Europe and European Issues


In his study on the contents of one of the key US-American dailies, the “New York Times” (NYT), Jerzy Olędzki provides an overview over how Polish image is constructed in the press of the main “enemy” of communist Poland, i.e. the USA. While, the author provides the study in type “what they say about us” (with the us vs. them logic clearly present throughout the entire publication), Olędzki’s study appears to be one of the typical instances of media studies, which, in an event-specific way, analyzes how foreign media describe Poland and interpret Polish social and political occurrences. It is crucial to see that the interest of the author in American media is also very symptomatic for pre-1989 Polish media research: in line with official state ideology, it was the USA (not Western European countries), which is perceived throughout the study as the main carrier of the capitalist ideology of the “West”.

According to Olędzki, the press reporting of the NYT concerned several key thematic areas, including “1) Polish economic situation, 2) Willy Brandt’s visit to

Warsaw and the Polish-German Treaty, 3) riots on the coast, 4) changes in the leadership of the party and in the Polish government, 5) the image of Polish cities which were sites of the worker-riots.”

As the author notes, “all of the materials about Poland published in the NYT in December 1970 emphasised a claim that the socialist camp is in deep crisis,” suggesting that the Polish situation might be symptomatic for other such occurrences to soon follow in other socialist and communist countries. Following Olędzki, one may claim, however, that such a picture painted by American journalists was inherently untrue and did not mirror the social and political reality. As the author argues, the press articles of NYT, which “created an illusion of truthful, honest and exact mirror of occurrences” were actually missed the point in their overall drive to present the NYT’s ideology filled with: “1) anti-communism, 2) anti-Soviet attitude, 3) Germanophilia, and 4) conviction of superiority of Western civilization.”

As Olędzki interpreted his findings, “it seems that the New York Times of December 1970 did not bring Poland too many friends from across the Ocean: in the end-effect [the newspaper] created a negative attitude towards the socialist system and all of us in the [communist] camp.”

However, as it is also argued, the attitude of the NYT does not entail any “call to crusade against the “Reds”: it only serves to convince American society that the communist system is no alternative for Americans who live peacefully and whose stomachs are full.”

In a somewhat related work on “international image building” through the media, Lewartowska describes her analysis of how Poland is presented in the key dailies in France (“Le Monde”, LM), West Germany (“Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”, FAZ), and in the US-owned “International Herald Tribune” (IHT). She juxtaposes and compares results of her analysis with the examination how the countries in which the said papers originate (viz. France, West Germany, and the USA) are presented, in the same period, in Poland’s main communist daily, “Trybuna Ludu” (TL). As the author assumes, the “countries” that she selected for her

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24 Ibidem, p. 43. All translations of Polish sources used in the study are mine.
25 The term “socialist” (with regards to socialist countries) is the direct equivalent of the adjective “communist” used in the same context in the Western literature.
26 Ibidem, p. 44.
27 Ibidem.
28 Ibidem.
29 Ibidem, p. 52.
30 Ibidem, p. 44.
31 Ibidem, p. 45.
Towards the Historical Dynamics of a European Public Sphere?

analysis was dictated by the intensified international relations and diplomacy between the said countries in the period of her investigation (viz. between September 1977 and February 1978, which was when E. Gierek, the Polish Communist Party’s then-secretary, visited Paris, and Chancellor H. Schmidt and President J. Carter visited Warsaw\(^{33}\)).

In her versatile analyses, Lewartowska examined which geographical regions of the countries in question are represented in the newspapers and why or how many reports on particular countries appear in the newspapers during the analysed period. Within the main themes of reporting, Lewartowska points out the following as key topics of the texts (ordered within interchangeable interest\(^{34}\)):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Trybuna Ludu” about France:</th>
<th>“Le Monde” about Poland:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– France in front of elections</td>
<td>– Mutual relations [Poland-France]</td>
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<tr>
<td>– Mutual relations [Poland-France]</td>
<td>– Polish internal politics</td>
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<tr>
<td>– Cultural contacts [Poland-France]</td>
<td>– [Polish Catholic] church-state relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>– Economic problems in France</td>
<td>– Economic problems in Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Social Problems in France</td>
<td>– [Polish] living conditions and contestation*</td>
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<tr>
<th>“Trybuna Ludu” about West Germany:</th>
<th>FAZ about Poland:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– Normalization of relations [Poland-FRG(^{**})]</td>
<td>– Bilateral relations [Poland-FRG]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– The threat of neo-Nazism</td>
<td>– Mood of the Chancellor’s visit [to Poland]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Terrorism</td>
<td>– [Polish Catholic] church-state relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– [WWII] war crimes</td>
<td>– Economic anomalies [in Poland]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Party politics [in FRG]</td>
<td>– Contestation</td>
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<th>“Trybuna Ludu” about USA:</th>
<th>IHT about Poland:</th>
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<tr>
<td>– USA and its international presence</td>
<td>– Contestation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Disarmament and arms</td>
<td>– Role of the [Catholic] church in Poland</td>
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* Lewartowska does not clarify the definition of the term “contestation” (used consequently throughout the table). It seems, however, that it refers to the general contestation of the Western media about the socialist (communist) system and its social and political impact.

** Abbreviation for “Federal Republic of Germany”, the official name of West Germany.

\(^{33}\) Ibidem, p. 26

Lewartowska interprets her findings within the outlined thematic areas as inherently asymmetric. She claims that the scope of the issues taken up and reported by TL is accurate and resembles reality, whereas the issues taken up by LM, FAZ, and IHT are purposefully selected to build a negative image of Poland. In this way, the author, similarly to Goban-Klas, defines the socialist press reporting as truthful and based on facts. As she assumes, that the image of Poland built in respective countries (and newspapers) is significantly different: “It is fuzzy in “Le Monde”, not free from old stereotypes in FAZ, and basically tendentious in IHT”.

In so doing, Lewartowska wants to present Polish press as truthful, and foreign press as still “dipped” in the spirits of the past. As she concludes, “the good will [in reporting] must be foregrounded and the way to achieve this aim is mainly in versatility of reporting”. As she assumes, the Polish press mainly achieves the latter. The “Western” newspapers and their reporting are, on the contrary, summarised in the following statement: “One may write [about Poland] in a more or less critical manner, but one is not entitled in any case to recall the spirits of bad history”.

In his related though somewhat more theoretically oriented study, Goban-Klas explores the issue of social values and their construction in the messages transmitted through the mass media. In his study, based mainly on secondary sources, Goban-Klas argues that mass media, by creating certain images of the world (and parts thereof), or, by selecting who is included/excluded from media representations alone, contribute to the reinforcement and spread of certain social values. In his “illustrating examples”, Goban-Klas points to various hierarchies of building social interest in various countries and areas of the world (in various nationally-specific media) as clearly contributing to fostering and changing the value hierarchies of the readers (viz. Goban-Klas mainly focuses on press texts in his analysis). As the author assumes, the Soviet press would mainly present (in a top-down order) European communist countries, USA, Western Europe, Asia, and the Far East. The American press would, in turn, focus mainly on the occurrences in Western Europe, followed by Asia and the Far East, and the neighbouring countries of the USA, while the Soviet Union and its satellite communist states would take the last place in the frequency of reporting. As Goban-Klas assumes,

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36 Z. Lewartowska, op.cit., p. 44.
37 Ibidem.
38 Ibidem.
39 T. Goban-Klas, op.cit.
such hierarchies are very illustrative for presenting certain areas in a more favourable (and more frequent) way. Also, he points to the fact that, in line with those hierarchies, certain ideologies are being transmitted to the public. Here, Goban-Klas alludes to the “New York Times”, which he claims to “represent capitalist press which is in tact with capitalist ideology and capitalist relations”.

Goban-Klas also argues that the ways in which events are presented in the area-specific press (also within the said hierarchies) are very influential for creating values and attitudes. As he assumes, “the commentaries in the Western press are, in general, standing ahead of the events which are reported, while the commentaries in the socialist press focus on the events which have already taken place”.

Accordingly, he also argues that, in the socialist press, “there is a tendency to take up the issues and events of/from other countries in a broader way, in particular if those events had a positive outcome”. In such way, Goban-Klas (implicitly) argues that the socialist ideology, displayed in the socialist press, favours “openness” and international interest as certain values, which are transmitted through the mass media of the socialist states.

3.2. Polish Studies on Media and Europe/European Issues in the 1990–2005 Period

Three studies that open up the overview of Polish media studies after 1989 stem from, by far, the most comprehensive research project investigating the image of Europe in the Polish press. The project took place in 1991 and focused on the change of the image of Europe and the criteria for Europeanness in Polish press in the three years of 1989, 1990, and 1991. The both quantitative and qualitative analyses focused on a large-scale sample of Polish press, including national dailies (“Gazeta Wyborcza”, “Życie Warszawy”, “Rzeczpospolita”, “Dziennik Polski”, and

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41 T. Goban-Klas, op.cit., p. 16.
42 Ibidem.
“Gazeta Bankowa”), their regional counterparts (“Gazeta Krakowska” and “Czas Krakowski”), as well as weekly nationwide magazines (“Tygodnik Powszechny”).

In the most general overview over results of the project, Mikułowski-Pomorski enumerates a list of final conclusions with regards to the presence of Europe in post-1989 Polish media. Those conclusions point to the fact that, inter alia:

- “The issues regarding Europe are widely-present in the [analysed] press” and “a growing interest in those issues can be observed”;  
- “Various visions of Europe and its characteristics appear” while “A new way of presenting European as well as international issues is emerging: this way is different from the ways of reporting specific for the times of real-socialism [until 1989]”;  
- “The interest in various sub-regions of Europe depends on the assessment of conditions and possibilities of Polish role within those regions”;  
- “Europe appears in the press as a type of reality and as a symbol of normality”;  
- “European issues are closely tied to the issues of [Polish] internal affairs” while “touching upon European issues is, in a way, characterised by moralising: its aim is to educate the society and cause [further] changes”;  

Those conclusions, which are very symptomatic for the general change that was taking place in the Polish media in the period immediately following the big change of 1989, clearly point to the increased presence of Europe in reporting and other media genres. This feature is significantly different from the previous period when Europe was almost not at all a category present in the Polish media and when the international reporting (portrayed mainly in the press) was only interested in presenting “enemies” of the communist Poland, among which the USA played the prominent role.

Among diverse topics describing Europe in the analysed press-reporting, Mikułowski-Pomorski points to “criteria of Europeanness”, which, according to the author, are used and invoked in the press texts in order to create the image of Poland and other countries as belonging to the European space and/or as the ones which can (already) be defined as European. Those “criteria of Europeanness” include such specifically Polish post-transformation values, such as, inter alia, “the love of freedom and the will to break the Russian domination”, “departure from

45 Ksztaltowanie sie Obrazu Europy..., op.cit.  
46 Ibidem, p. 84.  
47 Ibidem, p. 76.  
48 Ibidem, emphasis added.
Towards the Historical Dynamics of a European Public Sphere?

communism”\textsuperscript{49}, and the subsequent commitment to “radical and complete economic reforms”\textsuperscript{50}. Then, the author also refers to “social order” defined as a lack of “national conflicts”\textsuperscript{51} as one more criterion of Europeanness. Poland, whose role is, according to Mikułowski-Pomorski, defined as the “historical occident of Europe”\textsuperscript{52}, seems to fulfil most of the criteria enumerated above. An exception here is constituted by yet another specifically European feature of “work ethics (\textit{pracowitość})”\textsuperscript{53}. Mikułowski-Pomorski argues this feature can be questioned with regard to all Poles, as well as several former communist nations.

Similarly, in his work, Mikułowski-Pomorski also points to certain “viewpoints of the Press with regard to values which enable a Pole to take part in Europe”\textsuperscript{54}, all of which seem to provide a further differentiation of Poland’s typical European features, as well as its (potential) role in the future development of the European space. As he assumes, those viewpoints may largely be categorised in categories, such as “a Christian-national, a liberal-democratic and the one linked to the communist opposition”\textsuperscript{55}. According to the author, the first of those viewpoints (i.e. the Christian-national one) forges a viewpoint of Poland as primordially European. This than clearly coincides and competes with the liberal-democratic vision, which sees the “future of Poland in the rule of law and tolerance”\textsuperscript{56}. It is within this conception that Poles are often described as “\textit{homo sovieticus}”\textsuperscript{57} while it is also strongly argued that Poland must find and work through its “comeback to Europe”\textsuperscript{58}, mainly defined through building the structures of a state based on the said rule of law. Lastly, the viewpoint characterised by Mikułowski-Pomorski as typical for the communist opposition is defined through several claims typical for politicians and social activists linked to the former “nomenklatura”. According to the author, those actors frequently claim “the rejection of Russian domination was the effect of their years efforts and that, if allowed, they would lead the country to a better and more just reality different form that created by people from the Solidarity camp”\textsuperscript{59}.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[49] Ibidem, p. 77, emphasis added.
\item[50] Ibidem, emphasis added.
\item[51] Ibidem.
\item[52] Ibidem, p. 78.
\item[53] Ibidem, emphasis added.
\item[54] Ibidem, p. 82.
\item[55] Ibidem, emphasis added.
\item[56] Ibidem, p. 83.
\item[57] Ibidem, cf. below.
\item[58] Ibidem.
\item[59] Ibidem.
\end{footnotes}
In a similar vein, Pucek\textsuperscript{60} focuses on various ways of portraying Europe and Europeanness. While elaborating a strand of the same corpus of data, he focuses on differences in image of Europe portrayed in a liberal newspaper (“Gazeta Wyborcza”) in contrast to a conservative one (“Czas Krakowski”). He also supplements his conclusions with an analysis of reporting and European image building in a widely respected magazine (“Tygodnik Powszechny”), which is associated with the Catholic intelligentsia. In his detailed analysis of the so-called “conceptions of Europeanness” represented by each of the two examined dailies, Pucek points out that the liberal “Gazeta Wyborcza” (GW) clearly favours the so-called “universal Europeanness based on a vision of one Europe”\textsuperscript{61}, whereas “Czas Krakowski” (CK) postulates the “idea of particular Europeanness corresponding to the conception of Europe of fatherlands”\textsuperscript{62}. Accordingly, unlike CK, GW rejects the idea of Central Europe (corresponding with the long-standing concept of Mitteleuropa) and “discards its role as the main point of reference for Poland”\textsuperscript{63}. Here, “one Europe comes to the foreground; Europe is a whole irrespective of various internal divisions; Europe is in the process of rejecting those divisions; the Berlin Wall is falling”\textsuperscript{64}. On the contrary, the “particular Europeanness” of CK is based on “a set of Catholic-national principles”\textsuperscript{65}. Thus, unlike in GW, Poland does not need to come back to Europe. On the contrary, “Poland is much more in Europe than the liberal, permissive and consumption-oriented societies of the West”\textsuperscript{66}.

Pucek also elaborates the issue of Europe-related values. As the author suggests, the issue of a “European norm”\textsuperscript{67} comes to be presented very frequently in the analysed material, in particular with regard to the postulate of striving for “normality”\textsuperscript{68}, perceived as a departure from communism and a typical “product of the communist-collectivist spirit”\textsuperscript{69} defined by Pucek and elsewhere as homo sovieticus\textsuperscript{70}. According to Pucek, the European norm perceived as a collective ori-

\textsuperscript{60} Z. Pucek, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibidem, p. 42, emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibidem, emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibidem, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibidem, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibidem, p. 48.
\textsuperscript{70} The concept of “homo sovieticus” was originally coined by the late Polish philosopher and theologian Józef Tischner (cf. e.g. Tożsamość w Czasach Zmiany: Rozmowy w Castel Gandolfo [Identity in Changing Times: Talks in Castel Gandolfo], K. Michalski (ed.), Kraków 1995). It was also
entation and through the drive for normality is, despite its clear ambivalence, “elaborated in two dimensions: material-economic and cultural-spiritual”\textsuperscript{71}. The second dimension, which is of special interest for our research, “concerns the canon of moral, systemic, social and economic rules, among which economic rationality, human and civic rights and freedoms, tolerance and integration tendencies come to the fore”\textsuperscript{72}. As Pucek also suggests, “Tygodnik Powszechny” supplements this list of features or rules by the personal Christian values\textsuperscript{73}.

The work of Fiut and Matuzik\textsuperscript{74} opens up a set of media studies describing Polish media in the process of the (then forthcoming) Eastern enlargement, including Poland, of the European Union. Importantly, Fiut and Matuzik also depart from the “traditional” press analyses and focus on the scope of “European issues” in Poland’s most popular internet-based information portals, such as Onet.pl, Gazeta.pl, Interia.pl, and Wirtualna Polska (wp.pl). In their analysis, Fiut and Matuzik focus on information-oriented texts published on the said internet sites between March 15\textsuperscript{th} and April 20\textsuperscript{th}, 2003 (viz. the time preceding Polish EU accession referendum taking place in early June 2003). The authors argue that, within the time of their investigation, Onet.pl was the website most interested in Europe (with the percentage of texts related to Europe measured at 47.05\% of all the texts published), followed by Gazeta.pl (23.50), Interia.pl (17.60), and wp.pl (11.70\%). On the other hand, an analysis of contents of the examined material shows that, contrary to the expectations and hypotheses, Europe/EU have not become key issues in the reporting of key Polish internet portals during the period prior to Poland’s referendum on EU accession. Hence, it may be concluded that the link between periods/process of transformation (such as the 1989 change described above) have been broken in the Polish media. Namely, Europe is not negotiated as such prior to Polish joining the EU with the main foci of the analysed web reports pertaining to some rather mechanistic and institutional-political aspects of EU enlargement (with EU politics and accession negotiations as the key topics). Internal Polish issues come second. Here, the main aspect of the reported issues pertain to “social

\textsuperscript{71} Z. Pucek, op.cit., p. 49.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibidem, emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibidem, emphasis added.
affairs and the referendum”\textsuperscript{75}, where, interestingly enough, the referendum, which clearly refers to Poland’s international “move”, such as joining the EU, is treated as an internal Polish phenomenon.

In a somewhat similar way, Pokorna-Ignatowicz\textsuperscript{76} analyses Europe-related contents of one of the most peculiar post-1989 media Polish institutions: the radical-Catholic Radio Maryja (RM; based in Torun and active since 1991). The author focuses on the RM’s anti-European (mainly anti-EU) rhetoric, fuelled by the overall criticism of any liberal (social or economic) views, which often draw on instances of overt nationalism as well as anti-Semitism and anti-German sentiment. According to Pokorna-Ignatowicz, the conception of European integration put forward by RM is based on its criticism that “the buzzwords of united Europe conceal the century-long expansionism of the Germans”\textsuperscript{77}. In this context, “the European Union is the most serious threat to Polish identity, sovereignty, culture, religion and nation, while it embodies all major sins of contemporary reality: permissivism, atheism and civilization of death based on abortion and euthanasia”\textsuperscript{78}. Further, the European Union, whose “ideas” are frequently equalised with those of the liberally oriented Western Europe, “is a threat to the family, since it allows homosexual marriages and depraves the youth through sexual education”\textsuperscript{79}. Finally, the Union, is “yet another embodiment of century-long German expansionism which threatens Polish land and its inhabitants”\textsuperscript{80}. This specific list of European “negative values” is also emphasised by the fact that with Poland “joining the Union will mean a fatal threat traditional values, religion, family and fatherland and all the nation”\textsuperscript{81}.

Then, Hofman\textsuperscript{82} returns to the analyses of the press by focusing on the development of Europe-oriented discourse in Polish liberal weekly “Polityka” known for its widely respected “reliability of information”\textsuperscript{83}. Hofman analysed reports and other genres published in “Polityka” between 1998 and 2003 (the period of Polish-

\textsuperscript{75} Ibidem, p. 72.
\textsuperscript{76} K. Pokorna-Ignatowicz, Telewizja w Systemie Politycznym i Medialnym PRL [TV in the Political and Media System of PRL (Polish People’s Republic)], Kraków 2003.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibidem, p. 200.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibidem, p. 203.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{82} I. Hofman, Polska Droga do Unii Europejskiej w świetle Kampanii Prasowej „Polityki” [Polish Journey to the European Union in the Light of “Polityka” Press Campaign] [in:] Europa w Polsce, Polska w Europie [Europe in Poland, Poland in Europe], B. Koszel (ed.), p. 187–214.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibidem, p. 187.
EU negotiations, beginning in 1998 and culminating with Polish officials attending the 2003 European Summit in Brussels, where Polish politicians played the key role in defending the provisions of the EU’s Nice treaty). While Hofman points to different topics thematised in Europe-related debates, the issue of European identity comes to the forefront of her analyses. As the author argues, despite historical differences among European nations, “an ever-wider penetration of European consciousness, in particular in relation to culture, can be observed; the latter is also a chance for a dialogue with ethnic and religious minorities”\(^84\). It is also in this context that the debates about features (values?) of Europe appear. As suggested, “Europe’s strength is its “accumulation” of sovereignty of states on the way to their interests and common good, as well as “harmonization” of supplementary differences and creating common decision-making”\(^85\).

In probably the most insightful article from one of the very few book-length works about Europe in the Polish media\(^86\), Magdalena Lisowska-Magdziarz analyzes the contents of “postings” on europa.onet.pl, one of Poland’s most frequently visited Europe-oriented internet portals. Her analysis is based on a sample of ca. 400 postings collected, on a random basis, during the period of July 18\(^{\text{th}}\)-22\(^{\text{nd}}\), 2003, and according to a search based on the keyword “Europa”. Several European and other international events, which prompted a debate on European issues, according to the author, mainly prompted the analysed postings. Among those occurrences there were Poland’s referendum on EU accession, debates on the EEU Constitution, the European Song Contest, or the American invasion of Iraq\(^87\).

Lisowska-Magdziarz points to a very interesting set of various definitions of Europe put forth by the web surfers in their postings. As she assumes, two main criteria were used to define Europe: “1) associations with a set of criteria [constituting Europe] of historical, political, economic, civilizational, and geographic character; 2) defining Europe by simply juxtaposing it with the EU – through identification or opposition, yet rarely defining whether EU has anything to do with political, social or economic characteristics”\(^88\). As the author argues, “[using] cultural and/or civilizational criteria was a way for the web-surfers to differentiate

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\(^{84}\) Ibidem, p. 194.

\(^{85}\) Ibidem.


\(^{88}\) Ibidem, p. 145.
between Europe and “non-Europe” while, in turn, the authors of the postings clearly referred to “a controversy as to the actual civilizational uniqueness of Europe and to what could actually define this uniqueness.” In a similar way, Lisowska-Magdziarz points to several aspects of defining the Europeanness of those involved in the internet debates and their possible answers to the question: “Am I indeed European?”. Here a set of visions and conceptions of Europe clearly comes to the forefront. By using either the criteria enumerated above, or, by “defining Europe through denial or juxtaposition – by pointing to whom Europe does not belong and looking for [Europe’s] most conspicuous and convincing contradictions”. In this context, “the Christianity of Europe constitutes an important component in 48 (12%) of 400 investigated postings; in 28 it is emphasised that Europe is Christian, while in 12 there appears a vision of a rational and secular Europe, which is sometimes (yet rarely) faithful to the ideas of the Enlightenment.

Clearly standing out from the other analysed post-1989 Polish media studies on Europe, a volume edited by Fałkowski focuses on the image of Poland in the foreign (European) press just before the “zero hour” of Polish accession to the European Union in May of 2004. In the study, key liberal and conservative dailies and weeklies from several European countries (Germany, France, Spain, and the UK) were analysed, mainly in terms of their reporting of Poland strictly limited to the “behaviour” of Polish politicians at the end of the negotiation process and within the context of the notorious 2003 EU Summit. Interestingly, despite its clearly European focus, the study serves as an example of Europe-related studies, which, due to their far too strong focus on the nitty-gritty of EU politics, remain rather limited in terms of elaborating – or analysing – visions of Europe or of related notions. Accordingly, in the said study, there is almost no interest in defining Europe, Europeanness, and/or providing any sets/catalogues of specifically European values in any broader sense. Instead, both the introduction and the country-specific chapters pay very close attention to the ways in which Poland’s stance on various EU-specific issues (such as the Draft of the Constitutional treaty rejected by the 2003 IGC) has caused the country to break with several allies within Europe.

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89 Ibidem, p. 146.
90 Ibidem.
91 Ibidem.
92 Ibidem, p. 147.
which is understood as the EU. Also, it is very crucial to see how, in various countries in question, Poland’s decision to join the US-led alliance in the Second Gulf War was widely debated throughout Europe. Among these EU-oriented debates in the media with respect to Poland, it is only once that one may identify any reference whatsoever to the non-political aspects of Europe understood as the EU. Within this reference, stated in the summary of the French reporting provided by Fałkowski in his introduction\textsuperscript{95}, it is debated whether Poland’s ability to integrate into Europe is indeed mature, judging by the country’s opposition to the specifically European (i.e. France-led) initiatives, such as the European Constitution. It is in this context that it is suggested that, despite being “let into” the EU, the accession states still “remain outside” the core of the Union\textsuperscript{96,97}.

Finally, Olechowska\textsuperscript{98} focuses on the analysis of key Polish weekly magazines in the first and very troubled year of Poland’s membership in the European Union. The author analyses magazines, such as “Polityka”, “Newsweek Polska”, and “Wprost” (the most widely read Polish weeklies), in the period between May 2004 and April 2005, paying special attention to the ways in which the Draft Treaty of the European Constitution as well as political and public debates surrounding its widely debated failure were presented. As Olechowska suggests, the bulk of the interest of Polish weeklies in the European Constitution centres around two main aspects that also guided Polish political interests: 1) the issue of the famous “Polish preamble”\textsuperscript{99} to the constitution; 2) the vote counting system in the European Coun-

\textsuperscript{95} Ibidem p. 13.
\textsuperscript{97} Such a stance clearly fuels the “core-periphery logic” that reappeared in the EU following the 2003 Iraq crisis and the row of the European Constitution (cf. Oberhuber et. al., op.cit.). It also suggests that, despite the widely praised unity within the EU, the latter is not any unified body and is indeed a conglomerate of very often-contradictory national interests.
\textsuperscript{99} The slogan “Polish preamble” refers to the (eventually rejected) form of Preamble to the European Constitution that was proposed by Polish members of the European Convention and originally supported by the EPP-ED fraction of the European Parliament representatives therein. The Preamble, which included clear reference to God as well as to Christian traditions and roots of Europe, resembled the preamble to Constitution of Poland passed in 1997 (Cf. M. Krzyżanowski, E. Oberhuber, \textit{(Un) Doing Europe: Discourses and Practices of Negotiating the EU Constitution}, Brussels 2007).
cil introduced through the (non-binding) Treaty of Nice, which strengthened Poland’s position and which was supposed to be abolished by the Constitution. In particular, the analyzed press showed very broad interest in the issue of the preamble, which was supposed to include the reference to Christian values as foundations of Europe. No actual values, however, were listed. Rather, it was mainly debated whether the Christian roots of Europe shall be anchored in the Draft Treaty of the European Constitution.

4. Conclusions

4.1. Europe and European Issues in Post-War Polish Media Studies

The critical analysis of the media studies analysed and described above shows that, in Poland, contrary to our expectations (stemming from, e.g., the crucial closeness of the country to Europe until 1989), one has been dealing with a relatively sizeable corpus of media studies. Also, all of those studies could be placed in three clearly distinguishable periods: the mid-1970’s (later defined as Period I and largely converging with the period of growing international interests of Polish media at the time of “international openness” favoured by the then-communist regime), in the period of early 1990’s (Period II: largely converging with the “Big Change” of 1989 and the first years thereafter), and in the period of early 2000’s (Period III: marked by the growing number of Polish actions leading to the country’s EU membership in 2004). In all three periods, various media were analysed/described in the identified media studies. While Period I focused solely on the press, Periods II and III yielded a diversified set of analyses of press, radio, and, later, of the web content, with the notable exception of the television contents (not analysed in any of the three identified periods).

The said three periods, largely dividing the Polish corpus, allow us to see the varied presence of “Europe” and “European issues” in the post-war Polish media studies. In the Period I (1970’s), no studies dealing explicitly with “European issues” were actually introduced. However, within that period, we witness a very large degree of interest in the analyses of “foreign” media where the scope of the latter is limited to presenting the United States (and its western-European allies, such as Germany) as the main “enemies” of the “camp” of socialist (communist) countries in general, and of Polish state system in particular. While we witness some references to values in Polish media studies identified during Period I, it must be noted that those values are defined as exclusively national-internal “social val-
Towards the Historical Dynamics of a European Public Sphere?

ues” and are largely classified as specific for the Polish form of a communist/social-
ist system and ideology.

In the Period II (1989 and thereafter), we witness a significant and unprece-
dented interest in “European issues”. The extremely large scope of the latter in that period is defined as, indeed, an “obsession with Europe”\(^{100}\) and leads to the place-
ment and elaboration of the latter within various definitions of “Europe” put into a multitude of social and political contexts, which include “geography, politics, economy and culture”\(^{101}\). In the same period, we also witness a significant number of “definitions of Europeanness” and various forms of “European values”, which are negotiated in connection with the former.

Finally, in Period III (early-mid 2000’s), we see that, in line with an increased number of actions leading to Poland’s EU membership and undertaken by variety of social, political, and economic actors (including the media\(^{102}\), “Europe”, as a concept, gradually disappears from the contents of the Polish media’s messages and is gradually replaced, or ideologically conflated, with that of the “EU”. However, the merger of those two concepts clearly takes place in a highly imbalanced way and thus contributes to the “EU” becoming a clearly stronger definition, which actually obscures “Europe” and appears to be potentially more meaningful than the latter. Accordingly, in Period III, the “ideational way” of talking about Euro-

Period II of Polish media studies (the 1989 Big Change and thereafter) is the first one to yield elaborate definitions of “Europe” (viz. due to its European international interest, those definitions are not present in Period I). The definitions of Europe that appear and develop in the early period of the post-1989 transition in Poland can be grouped, in line with the analysed media studies, in two distinct groups. The first set of visions of Europe sees it in primarily pragmatic and eco-
nomic terms. This conception allows placing Polish modernization in a wider, European perspective and was used to foster internal (mainly economic) reforms in Poland in the course of the generally perceived “modernization” of the country. It is within these conceptions of Europe that the widely debated slogan of the “Polish comeback to Europe” was introduced when arguing for the rapid change in Polish economy and state system and its fast, modernization-specific “catching

\(^{100}\) Z. Pucek, op.cit., p. 38.

\(^{101}\) Ibidem.


\(^{103}\) Cf. M. Krzyżanowski, The Discursive Construction..., op.cit.
up” with “western standards”\textsuperscript{104}. On the other hand, in Period II, a set of civilizational-geographic visions of Europe also comes to the forefront. Within that vision, Europe is perceived as a certain civilization, as well as a certain geographical unit. Thus, Polish membership in Europe, as is argued in this conception, does not need to be debated since Poland, as a predominantly Christian country, is anyway strongly European since it fulfils the requirements of membership in European civilization based on Christian traditions and values. Additionally, the placement of Poland within the European continent (as a geographical unit) makes the country European. It is also clear that both of these arguments act strongly against the concept of Poland’s “comeback to Europe”; they postulate that Poland has always been European and must be identified as an inherent element of the European space. Partially inline with those viewpoints, some of the analysed media studies\textsuperscript{105} define a set of political ideologies that were clearly fostered and transmitted through the press in Period I. Those ideologies were, indeed, overtly congruent with the set of definitions of Europe outlined above. While the liberal democratic ideology clearly fostered the pragmatic economic vision of Europe (together with Poland's “comeback to Europe”), the opposite Christian-national visions remained in accordance with the civilizational-geographic conceptions of Europe.

The clear division of various definitions and conceptions of Europe is no longer very apparent in Polish media studies of Period III (2001–2005). Here, as indicated above, the overall drive to define Europe in/through the media is generally weakening in the advent of clearly EU-specific perceptions of Europe disseminated through the media in the process of Poland’s EU accession. Thus, definitions of Europe (as such, and as distinct from the EU) rarely come to the forefront in media discourses in Period III except for, as an example, the work by Lisowska-Magdziarz\textsuperscript{106}, who points to the fact that Europe is debated only when referring to “cultural and/or civilizational criteria […] to differentiate between Europe and “non-Europe”\textsuperscript{107}.

The rather static definitions of Europe enumerated and described above are, according to the analysed media studies, frequently “put into practice” and given pragmatic, socio-political meaning through the dynamic concepts of “European-ness”. Accordingly, in Period II, the dynamic conceptions of Europeanness are


\textsuperscript{105} Cf. e.g. Kształtowanie sie Obrazu Europy…, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{106} M. Lisowska-Magdziarz, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibidem, p. 146.
closely tied with different general ideological perceptions of Europe characteristic for that period. Hence, a liberal view of “universal Europeanness”\textsuperscript{108} is postulated while its antecedent of “particular Europeanness”\textsuperscript{109} is also frequently sought and elaborated in/through media studies. While the former, liberal vision sees Europe as civilization/geography (though clearly departs from the pre-1989 East-West logic), the latter, perceived clearly in some organizational economic setbacks of the country, urges for the modernization-specific Polish “comeback to Europe” (i.e. “catching up” with western standards of social, political and economic organization). And, while the vision of universal Europeanness rejects the idea of Central Europe (corresponding with the historical concept of \textit{Mitteleuropa}\textsuperscript{110}) and “discards its role of the main point of reference for Poland”\textsuperscript{111}, the particular conservative Europeanness is set to “correspond with the conception of Europe of fatherlands”\textsuperscript{112}, which was also debated outside of Poland while cherishing the \textit{Mitteleuropa} logic that sees Poland and other CEE countries as “the example of Europeanness”\textsuperscript{113}.

Sadly, the aforementioned elaboration attempts to conceptualise Europeanness in the Polish media in the early 1990’s gradually decrease, and, by the time another set of studies on Europe appears in Period III (early 2000’s), become almost exclusively deprived of larger philosophical-ideological interpretations in the wake of Polish debates about the European Union and its political, economic, and organizational aspects. However, of the very broad and general conceptions still remaining in Period III, one can witness only attempts of “defining Europe through denial or juxtaposition – by pointing whom Europe does not belong to and looking for its most conspicuous and convincing contradictions”\textsuperscript{114}. Interestingly, those definitions seem to be much more the remnants of the conceptions that appeared and were disseminated through the media in early 1990’s (NB: they are definitions put forth by individual users of internet forums) and hardly instances of “public visions” created by the nationwide, opinion-making media in the early 2000’s.

Finally, in line with the definitions of Europe and conceptions of Europeanness outlined above, the analysed media studies of Period II also yielded interesting

\textsuperscript{108} Z. Pucek, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{111} Z. Pucek, op.cit, p. 42, 44.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{114} M. Lisowska-Magdziarz, op.cit.
instances of definitions of “European values”. For example, in his study on Polish media contents in the 1989–1991 period, Mikulowski-Pomorski\textsuperscript{115} provides a set of what he defines as “criteria of Europeanness”\textsuperscript{116}. Interestingly, in his account, Mikulowski-Pomorski argues that, while several CEE countries do have those values in place in the early 1990’s (and thus are indeed “European”), other countries, such as Belarus, do not show their clear allegiance to the said “catalogue of principles” and, accordingly, allow for their actual “Europeanness” to be undermined and put into question.

As long as the catalogue of European values proposed by Mikulowski-Pomorski appears to be very localised (viz. exclusively specific for the countries undergoing what is generally defined as post-communist transition) the alternative principles proposed by Pucek\textsuperscript{117} with regard to Polish media contents of the 1989–1991 period seems to carry some more universal aspects. Within what Pucek describes as the “European norm”\textsuperscript{118}, largely defining collective aspirations of CEE countries in the period of transition (and disseminated through the media), the author points to a set of values that were further, in some contexts, enlarged by various values specific for different religious and ideological standpoints, as was the case with the set of “personal Christian values”\textsuperscript{119} clearly favoured by some media tied to catholic intelligentsia.

Although definitions of Europe and conceptions of Europeanness were rather scarce in what was defined here as Period III of post-1945 Polish media studies, it appears that various instances of social and political “values” (of which some may be seen as “European”) were still disseminated through the media in that period. Of all those values, Christianity appears to be the key Polish criterion of Europeanness, which was defined and elaborated in various forms of media studies, such as analyses of internet forums\textsuperscript{120} or diachronic analyses of Polish media accounts of the EU constitutional process\textsuperscript{121}. In particular, the latter seems to be of crucial importance here since the study by Olechowska shows how the “fight” for the Polish preamble of the European Constitution (including overt references to the Christian character and roots of Europe) displayed broad mobilization of Polish (political) actions around the value, which was defined as crucial for both na-

\textsuperscript{115} Kształtowanie sie Obrazu Europy..., op.cit.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibidem, p. 85.
\textsuperscript{117} Z. Pucek, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibidem, p. 48.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{120} M. Lisowska-Magdziarz, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{121} P. Olechowska, op.cit.
Towards the Historical Dynamics of a European Public Sphere?

In a different case, Hofman\textsuperscript{122} also shows how different (i.e. specifically supranational) values can be defined in line with key characteristics of the co-operation of sovereign nation-states within the European Union.

In Period III of Polish media studies, we also encounter a crucial example of definitions of explicitly anti-European values that are propagated by those Polish media, which clearly opposed European integration and Polish involvement in the European Union. In her analysis of an (almost fiercely) anti-European medium of Radio Maryja (a Catholic-nationalist radio station displaying clear anti-liberal as well as anti-Semitic tendencies), Pokorna-Ignatowicz\textsuperscript{123} enumerates a set of purely national values favoured by the radio and frequently displayed as not European. Among those values, the author points to “traditional values, religion, family and fatherland”\textsuperscript{124} as the key ones. She also shows how the issue of religion – perceived solely as Christianity – is approached differently in various media studies, which very often argue for the extension of Polish national Christianity onto the European level.

4.2. Event-Specific and Transnational Negotiation of “Europe” and “European Issues” in Polish Media Studies: Towards a European Public Sphere?

In relation to the analysed media studies one may claim that “European issues” were indeed introduced and explicitly/implicitly negotiated in connection with various “real world” social and political events. It seems that those events clearly triggered various negotiations of Europe-related issues thus proving that Europe, as such, is debated in the media “on the back of” reporting and commenting on various occurrences which thus “required” various visions, definitions and conceptions of Europe. Those conceptions, in turn, helped justify and legitimise various standpoints on, on one hand, the “national role” in Europe, or, on the other hand, the importance of Europe for nationally rooted and nationally oriented actions.

In the Polish case, one can see that two events largely defined the broad negotiation of “European issues” in/through the media. One of those events was clearly the “Big Change of 1989” (which yielded the bulk of media studies analysed

\textsuperscript{122} I. Hofman, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{123} K. Pokorna-Ignatowicz, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibidem.
above) while the other was the Poland’s EU accession of 2004. In an interesting way, both of those “events” pertained to a cascade of socio-political occurrences, approached as certain long-term processes. Accordingly, various definitions and conceptions of Europe clearly evolved and differed even within the individual event-specific media negotiations of “European issues”, which spanned these three distinct periods. Also, it is crucial to see that the two macro-events listed here clearly comprised of several micro-events (for example, the various “stages” of the Polish road to the EU in the second case) according to which the development and change in the various visions and opinions on/about Europe could be observed.

As it appears, the bulk of the state-transcending interests of Polish media studies already appear in the aforementioned Period I (i.e. 1970’s) when frequent comparisons between foreign and national media are proposed, mainly in line with the regime-obedient rhetoric of “us” vs. “them”. Interestingly, in all of those state-transcending studies, the interest is not on the European issues but on the comparison of how different national spaces (notably, Poland compared to other countries) are mutually perceived in the national media of various countries in strictly bilateral chains of arguments. One may say that as soon as “Europe” appears as a crucial dimension of Polish media studies (i.e. only after 1989), the elements of transnational comparison clearly disappear from the Polish analyses of various media discourses. For example, in Period II (1989–1991) we did not identify any study of a state-transcending focus of analysis (viz. only studies of the contents of national media were provided at that time), while, in Period III (2001–2005), we encountered only one overview of the “Polish image” in EU countries, which, however, bore no comparison between the foreign and the national media.

What, in any case, becomes very visible from the analysed Polish media studies is that the events that triggered the negotiation of “European issues” in media discourses were clearly of a nationally-specific (and not of transnational and/or European) character. Thus, as it seems, the negotiation of Europe in the media was taking place according to some strictly nationally oriented lines. The legitimization of various country-specific ideologies was sought in media references to Europe. In so doing, those ideologies become universalised (in philosophical and historical terms) and not only specific for the particular, “immediate” interests of the authors of media contents. On the other hand, Europe was portrayed (mainly in the EU-related media discourses) as the clear object of national identifications with the descriptions and negotiations of Europe-related issues clearly serving the legitimation of certain “national choices” (such as, e.g., the country’s accession to the EU).

125 *Pierwsze Kroki w Unii…*, op.cit.
Towards the Historical Dynamics of a European Public Sphere?

In any case, as it appears from the analysis, one could not observe any pan-European visions and conceptions of Europe and their subsequent appropriation in national arenas. On the contrary, what was encountered were clearly varying “national meanings of Europe”\textsuperscript{126}, which became very diverse in various national (media) contexts.

Thus, one may conclude that the state-transcending interest in the analysed Polish media studies was generally low and took place only separately from the clear negotiation of “Europe” and “European issues” (as was the case in the 1970’s). Hence, as has been shown, the very low academic interest in transnational comparisons between “national” and “foreign” media discourses reflect on the rather insufficient foundations of a transnational, historically conditioned European Public Sphere (EPS). On the contrary, what was witnessed through the analysed Polish studies was the clear continuation of a development of clearly national public spheres\textsuperscript{127}, which only rarely use elements of transnational comparison to negotiate some still nationally specific visions and conceptions of Europe.

\textbf{REFERENCES:}


\textsuperscript{126} \textit{The Meaning of Europe}, op.cit.


*The European Public Sphere and the Media: Europe in Crisis*, A. Triandafyllidou, R. Wodak, M. Krzyżanowski (eds.), Basingstoke 2009.


